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Abstract
This paper shows that the toleration of immigrants who are on average less
skilled than natives can be part of a support-maximizing government policy, de-
spite a general political bias in favor of the poor. We make this point in a simple
model with redistributive unemployment insurance. Once wage contracts are
binding, the government has an incentive to increase the unemployment bene-
fit, leading to excessive unemployment. Affecting the political balance within
the constituency, immigrants can serve as a commitment device against this
time-inconsistency. We show that this possibility can be greatly promoted by
restrictions on political naturalization.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the distributional implications of immigration can be harmful
for substantial parts of the population of the receiving country, in particular in the
presence of a welfare state. Being on average less skilled than natives, immigrants to
such countries do not only depress market incomes but also welfare payments of the
native poor. As shown by a number of authors, these adverse effects continue to prevail
even after taking politico-economic repercussions into account, as these adjustments
are either unsubstantial or even reinforcing (Mazza and van Winden, 1996, Kemnitz,
2002, Razin, Sadka and Swagel, 2002).
From a political economy perspective, this raises a puzzle. Given that the existence of
substantial welfare programs is explained by the political influence of the poor, a policy
harming this population group is unlikely to be implemented. It is therefore somewhat
bewildering that immigration to the OECD remains substantial and the average edu-
cation level of immigrants has even decreased in a number of countries.1 Although one
can take immigration as an inevitable facet of globalization and/or driven by humani-
tarian motives, a closer investigation of the political compatibility of immigration and
the welfare state seems legitimate.2
This paper argues that admitting immigrants who are on average less skilled than
natives can be part of the policy of a support-maximizing government generally biased
towards the low skilled. This possibility originates in a time-inconsistency problem on
part of the government: once wage contracts are signed, politicians have an incentive
to adjust the unemployment benefit in order to increase political popularity. Since
this behavior ignores the ex ante effects on wage setting, unemployment is excessive.
By affecting both the composition and the preferred policies of the politically active
population, immigrants can serve as a commitment device against such immoderate ex
post incentives. Particularly, the excessiveness of redistribution weakens the political
resistance of the native low skilled by so much that the government finds it worthwhile
to tolerate some migrants despite the existence of a welfare state due to the political
power of the poor.
1 Between 1999 and 2000, immigration to the EU rose by 3.2% (SOPEMI, 2003), with increases
above 10% in The Netherlands, Finland, and France. Simultaneously, these countries experienced
an increase in the share of foreigners having at most lower secondary education (SOPEMI, 2001,
2003; Table I.11.).
2 Working immigration varies significantly among countries from about none in Sweden to more than
50% in Portugal (SOPEMI, 2003; Chart I.2.).
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Obviously, this mechanism hinges on the premise that migrants curtail the political
influence of the poor. We show that such an effect can be promoted by strict rules for
political participation. For this purpose, we present a setting where the host follows
a closed border policy if migrants enjoy the same political rights as natives. Limiting
the franchise of the migrants, however, generates political support for their admission.
As a consequence, the equilibrium immigration policy features the toleration of some
migrants and limited naturalization.3
The combination of the government’s interest to balance the interests of various social
groups with a commitment problem on the decision on distorting transfers distinguishes
this model from the existing literature on the political economy of immigration. Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002) analyze low skilled immigration to an economy where the
median voter decides on a demogrant transfer financed by proportional income taxa-
tion. With the decisive voter being a low skilled native, they find that immigration
decreases the tax rate, a finding confirmed in a cross-country regression. As a conse-
quence, the host country prefers a closed border policy. Mazza and van Winden (1996)
and Kemnitz (2002) come to similar results in representative democracy models. Since
immigration implies factor price changes antagonizing the redistribution engineered by
the welfare state, both studies show that a government serving the interests of (low
skilled) workers tolerates no immigration. However, government commitment is not an
issue in either approaches: it is irrelevant in Mazza and van Winden (1996), considering
lump sum transfers, while the government anticipates the labor market consequences of
increasing unemployment insurance in Kemnitz (2002). Grether, de Melo and Mu¨ller
(2001) show that low skilled natives may prefer low skilled immigration when all na-
tives hold the same stock of another, fixed factor like physical capital. However, this
result relies on full employment and breaks down once low skilled households own very
little capital. Moreover, it is clearly at odds with existing evidence on individual atti-
tudes towards immigration (ISSP, 1995). The present approach, in contrast, is able to
reconcile immigrant admission with low skilled resistance.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the basic model and de-
rives the labor market and welfare state effects of an exogenously given number of
immigrants with exogenously given political power. Section 3 addresses the optimal
immigration policy, that is, both the support-maximizing number and political inte-
gration of immigrants.
3 Indeed, only about 3-4% of foreign residents acquire the nationality of the host in most OECD
countries per year. In 2000, Sweden and Portugal displayed the highest and lowest naturalization
rates of about 9% and 0.5%, respectively (SOPEMI, 2003; Chart I.18.).
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2 The Model
Consider an economy producing a single output good, composed of a large number
of intermediate goods. Each intermediate is produced in a separate industry sector
by atomistic firms employing high and low skilled labor H and L, respectively. To
simplify matters, all intermediates are perfect substitutes in producing the output
good. Moreover, all firms possess the same Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = AHαL1−α (1)
with α ∈ (1/2, 1].4
The native population comprises NH and NL high, respectively low skilled households.
The absence of any scale effects in the model allows us to normalize the total size of
the native population to unity and to express the native skill composition by the native
skill ratio hN = NH/NL.
For convenience, natives are assumed to be completely immobile, such that the economy-
wide skill ratio before immigration equals hN . However, after the immigration of M
households, of MH and ML are high respectively low skilled,the economy-wide skill
ratio becomes:
h =
hN + hMM
1 +M
, (2)
with hM = MH/ML denoting the immigrant skill ratio. Reflecting the stylized fact
that immigration to OECD countries is predominately, but not entirely low skilled, we
consider the case hM < hN , such that
dh
dM
= M(hN − hM)/(1 +M)2 < 0, but with
hM > 0.
5 For simplicity, the supply of immigrants is unlimited.
As immigrants and natives of equal qualifications are assumed to be perfect substitutes
in production, they face equal employment chances. While the high skilled become em-
ployed with certainty as that market is perfectly competitive, a low skilled’s probability
of not getting a job equals the low skilled unemployment rate:
4 The Cobb-Douglas technology is quite popular in the migration literature (Casarico and Devil-
lanova, 2003) and is mostly used for convenience. For the empirically more relevant case of the
elasticity of substitution between skills exceeding unity (Johnson, 1997), immigration would enjoy
even stronger political support than in the present setup for it would decrease the low skilled
unemployment rate for a given tax rate (Kemnitz, 2004).
5 According to SOPEMI (2003), the fraction of foreigners with at most lower secondary education
exceeds the respective fraction of natives in 15 of 21 considered OECD countries. At the same
time, the fraction of foreigners having received tertiary education exceeds the respective fraction
of natives in 14 of these nations. However, this figure is likely to overstate effective foreign high
skilled labor as many migrants work in less qualified occupations.
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u =
NL +ML − L
NL +ML
,
where L denotes total low skilled employment.
The government aims to maximize political support within the constituency. As elab-
orated by a number of studies (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Grossman and Helpman,
1996), this is tantamount to maximizing a politically weighted sum of the utilities of
all resident households, with the individual political weights comprising a variety of
factors like the disposition to be a swing voter or the membership in special interest
groups like trade unions, e.g.. In this section, we simply take these weights as exoge-
nous and attend to the determinants of political influence in more detail in the next
section. Normalizing the per capita weight of a high skilled native unity, a native low
skilled worker has relative influence λL, whereas an unemployed low skilled native has
the relative weight λLλU . In the following, λU ≥ 1, that is, political importance is non-
decreasing in the employment status. This feature introduces the ’single-mindedness
hypothesis’ of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) to the political economy of unemploy-
ment insurance. This hypothesis presumes that every citizen has a more or less fixed
amount of political resources to be allocated among various issues. Caring mostly
about redistributive programs, nonworkers tend to have fewer special interests than
workers caring about several countervailing issues due to different occupations and in-
dustry affiliations. This makes the unemployed ideologically more homogenous and
endows them with superior political importance. While this hypothesis has been used
exclusively in in the public pension context hitherto (see, e.g. Profeta, 2002), with the
retired gaining superior influence, the extension towards unemployment insurance is
natural.
With immigrants (if any) entering the country at stage 2, political decisions at stage 1
are guided by the preferences of the natives only. At stage 3, however, immigrants may
affect politics. We denote the political importance of an immigrant, relative to a high
skilled native, by µH , µL and µU = µLλU , respectively. These influence parameters de-
pend, among other things, on the rules for political naturalization determined at stage
1, an issue addressed in the following section.6 For convenience, the single-mindedness
6 The theoretical literature suggests that the higher cultural diversity of migrants translates into
a lower per capita weight. Mazza and van Winden (1996) consider the case where this diversity
erodes the political influence of workers, such that µL decreases inM . Fuest and Thum (2001) make
a similar argument with respect to trade union power. Since this may exert countervailing effects
on the stage 1 attitude of low skilled natives, we consider the per capita weights to be independent
of the number of migrants. From an empirical point of view, the importance of cultural diversity
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of the unemployed is symmetric, such that the relative political importance of an un-
employed low skilled compared to an employed low skilled is the same for natives and
immigrants. For further reference, let hN/λL (µHhM/µL) denote the relative political
influence of the native (immigrant) low skilled worker.
Terming the wages of skilled and unskilled workers wH and wL and assuming individual
utility to be logarithmic in income, the government enjoys political support
S = (NH + µHMH) log[(1− τ)wH ]
+(λLNL + µLML) ((1− u) log[(1− τ)wL] + u log[b]) , (3)
where τ is the tax rate and the government budget constraint (NL + ML − L)b =
τ(wHH + wLL) gives the unemployment benefit b =
λU τwL(1−u)
u(1−α) .
With wages and employment being fixed, the maximization of (3) with respect to τ
yields the first-order condition:
T = −NH + µHMH
1− τ + (λLNL + µLML)
[
−1− u
1− τ +
λUu
τ
]
= 0. (4)
All employed households deprecate unemployment insurance, whereas the jobless prefer
a tax rate of unity. Because marginal utility is infinite for zero income, the equilibrium
benefit is positive whenever some people are unemployed. Obviously, the generosity of
the benefit increases in both the number and the per capita influence of the jobless.
At stage 2, unions dictate the low skilled wage at the sectoral level in the interest of
their members. As usual in the literature (Schmidt et al., 1994, Fuest and Thum, 2000,
2001, Kemnitz, 2002,2004), macroeconomic repercussions of wage setting are ignored
because each sector is small. In particular, union wage setting disregards the fact that
the unemployment benefit increases in aggregate low skilled unemployment.7 As a
consequence, each union maximizes
U = (1− pi)L log[(1− τ)wL] + (NL +ML − (1− pi)L) log[w¯],
with respect to wL, taking w¯, the income of the workers not finding employment in the
home sector as given. Denoting the fraction of jobs captured by outside applicants, pi
is a measure of intersectoral labor turnover in the spirit of Layard et al. (1991).
is mitigated by the fact that migrants to most OECD countries stem predominately from one or
two origin countries with at least one of the top four sending countries having a border to the
respective receiving country (SOPEMI, 2003).
7 This is different with respect to lobbying at stage 3, where each union knows that a higher un-
employment benefit at the economy-wide level requires a higher tax rate. Introducing strategic
interactions between wage policies and social protection would make the analysis more cumbersome
without affecting the subsequent results.
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Taking into account that firms hire workers according to the marginal productivity
conditions, such that:
wH = αA(NH +MH)
α−1L1−α (5)
L =
(
wL
(1− α)A
)−1/α
(NH +MH), (6)
where we have already used the fact that high skilled labor is fully employed, the
first-order condition for the sectoral low skilled wage becomes:
(1− τ)wL = eαw¯,
where α is the negative inverse of the own wage elasticity of low skilled labor demand.
Due to the Cobb-Douglas technology, this elasticity is constant and the net low skilled
wage is a constant markup on the alternative wage w¯.
In the aggregate, NL + ML − (1 − pi)L low skilled workers do not get employed in
the home sector and apply for jobs elsewhere. As there are piL vacancies, the success
probability is:
ξ(u) =
piL
NL +ML − (1− pi)L =
pi(1− u)
1− (1− pi)(1− u) ,
with ξ′(u) < 0, ξ(0) = 1 and ξ(1) = 0. With the residual probability 1− ξ(u), workers
rely on unemployment benefits, such that the alternative wage is:
w¯ = ξ(u)(1− τ)EwL + (1− ξ(u))b. (7)
Considering the identity of all sectors and the government budget constraint gives the
aggregate wage setting relation:
W = (1− τ)(1− eαξ)− (1− ξ)eα τ
1− α
1− u
u
= 0. (8)
Hence, the labor market equilibrium is characterized by the compatibility of both wage
setting and political restrictions.
Proposition 1. There exists at least one labor market equilibrium characterized
by (4) and (8). Each equilibrium features low skilled unemployment and a positive
unemployment benefit.
Proof. Both W and T are upward sloping in (u, τ)-space. However, for u = 0, τ = 0
according to T , whereas u > 0 for τ = 0 according to W . For u = 1, T implies τ < 1
and W τ = 1. Therefore, both curves must intersect at least once. ¤.
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Both the wage setting and the political restriction exhibit a positive relation between
the tax rate and the low skilled unemployment rate. The more individuals are un-
employed, the higher is the political pressure for providing social protection, and the
higher the unemployment benefit is, the higher are union wage demands. Equilibrium
low skilled unemployment is positive because unions allow for some unemployment
even in the absence of a welfare state: for τ = 0, full employment would lead to the
equality of sectoral and alternative wage, which is inconsistent with a positive markup.
However, unemployment is not exhaustive, for this would require a politically infeasible
tax rate of unity.8
The system (4),(8) may feature multiple equilibria. In what follows, we assume that
the economy is (and remains) in an equilibrium with the property dτ/du|W > dτ/du|T
and hence:
D =
∂W
∂u
∂T
∂τ
− ∂T
∂u
∂W
∂τ
< 0. (9)
There is a double justification for this assumption. First, at least one equilibrium
with the property (9) must exist, because W must cross T at least once from below in
(u, τ)-space. Second, an increase in the alternative wage due to a rise in pi, increases
low skilled unemployment if and only if (9) holds:
du
dpi
=
−1
D
∂W
∂pi︸︷︷︸
(<0)
∂T
∂τ︸︷︷︸
(<0)
.
Obviously, immigration affects the government’s incentives for redistribution at stage
3:
Proposition 2. Immigration increases (decreases) both the tax rate and the low
skilled unemployment rate if and only if the relative political weight of the immigrant
low skilled worker is higher (lower) than the relative political weight of the native low
skilled worker.
sign
dτ
dM
= sign
du
dM
= sign
[
hN
λL
− µH
µL
hM
]
. (10)
8 With a tax rate of unity, all high skilled would be left with zero net income without having
the opportunity to escape into unemployment since employment contracts are binding. Hence,
opposition against both τ = 0 and τ = 1 is infinitely high.
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Proof. Use Cramer’s Rule to get:
du
dM
=
1
D
∂T
∂M
∂W
∂τ
dτ
dM
=
−1
D
∂T
∂M
∂W
∂u
Because ∂W
∂τ
< 0 and ∂W
∂u
< 0, the impact of immigration is determined by the sign of:
∂T
∂M
=
µLhN − µHλLhM
(1 + hM)(λLNL + µLM)
. ¤. (11)
Immigration shifts the government’s decision towards the group gaining more relative
power than before. When immigrants and natives are absolutely identical (µH/µL =
1/λL), only changes in population shares matter and immigration increases the low
skilled unemployment rate unambiguously. However, this can be reversed if the high
skilled immigrants have sufficiently more power.
3 Immigration Policy
At stage 1, the government decides on both the number and the political rights of
immigrants. Being guided by the interests of the natives only, it anticipates correctly
how such a policy affects the ex post incentives for redistribution.
It should be emphasized that native sentiments towards immigrants depend on a host of
factors, including security concerns and ethnic and racial identity. However, a number
of recent empirical studies conclude that individual attitudes are to a large extent
shaped by economic factors (Bauer et al., 2001, Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, Mayda,
2003). In a cross-country study, Mayda (2003) finds that differences in actual policies
can be explained by the skill composition of natives relative to immigrants. Hence, the
policy results from the government maximizing support:
SN = NH log(1− τ)wH + λLNL [(1− u) log(1− τ)wL + u log b] . (12)
Regarding the number of immigrants for given political participation, we have the
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first-order condition:
∂SN
∂M
=
∂UH
∂M
+ λLNL
∂EUL
∂M
=
wHNH
(1− τ)wH
[
− dτ
dM
wH + (1− τ)dwH
dM
]
+
λLNL(1− u)
(1− τ)wL
[
− dτ
dM
wL + (1− τ)dwL
dM
]
+λLNL
[
u
τ
dτ
dM
+
u
wL
dwL
dM
− 1
1− u
du
dM
]
− λLNL log (1− τ)wL
b
du
dM
,
which by (4) can be transformed to:
∂SN
∂M
=
dτ
dM
[
µHMH
1− τ + µLML
[
1− u
1− τ −
u
τ
]
+
(1− λU)µLNL
τ
]
+
du
dM
[
(α− 1)(NH + λLNL)
1− u − log
(1− τ)wL
b
]
+
dh
dM
(α− 1)NH + αλLNL
h
. (13)
The number of immigrants admitted for given political rights results from the interplay
of three effects: a tax effect, an unemployment effect and a skill ratio effect. The latter
effect describes how a change in the skill ratio, holding τ and u constant, translates
into political support. Straightforward calculations show that this effect is negative if
and only if:
λL
hN
>
1− α
α
. (14)
This condition is easy to interpret. As defined above, λL/hN is the political weight of
the native low skilled relative to the native high skilled. (1−α)/α, however, is the ratio
of low and high skilled earnings before redistribution wHH/wLL, which measures the
relative economic weight of the low skilled. Whenever (14) holds, we call the political
process biased towards the low skilled, because a lump sum transfer from the high
skilled to the low skilled increases political support (Mazza and van Winden, 1996).9
Proposition 3. The host country tolerates some immigration, when the relative polit-
ical weight of the native low skilled exceeds the relative political weight of the immigrant
low skilled and the political process is not too biased towards the low skilled.
9 To be precise, Mazza and van Winden (1996) derive this effect in the context of capital and labor.
In our setting, the respective problem is maxT NH log(wH − T ) + λLNL log(wL +NH/NLT ) with
the first order condition −1/(wH − T ) + λL/(wL +NH/NLT ) = 0. Hence, the optimal transfer is
positive whenever (14) is fulfilled.
Immigration as a Commitment Device 10
Proof. For M = 0, (13) reduces to
∂SN
∂M
∣∣∣∣
M=0
=
(1− λU)µLNL
τ
dτ
dM
+
du
dM
[
(α− 1)(NH + λLNL)
1− u − log
(1− τ)wL
b
]
+
dh
dM
(α− 1)NH + αλLNL
h
(15)
With a policy bias in favor of the low skilled, the skill ratio effect is unambiguously
negative. However, the unemployment effect is positive for the first marginal immi-
grant. This holds because the lack of commitment renders a decrease of u beneficial for
both high and low skilled natives. Additionally, the tax rate effect is positive, because
the unemployed enjoy inadequate political influence at stage 3, evaluated from the
perspective of stage 1. Capturing the beneficial effects of immigration mitigating the
government commitment problem, these two effects dominate a positive, but moderate
political bias towards the low skilled. Hence, immigration is compatible with a political
predominance of the low skilled. This result stands in sharp contrast to the findings
under full employment (Mazza and van Winden (1996), Result 2) and unemployment
without commitment problems (Kemnitz, 2002).
Moreover, marginal immigration can even be tolerated although the expected utility
of the native low skilled:
∂EUL
∂M
=
[
−1− u
1− τ +
u
τ
]
dτ
dM
+−
[
α− 1
1− u + log
(1− τ)wL
b
]
du
dM
+
dh
dM
α
h
(16)
decreases. This is possible because the distortions caused by the lack of commitment
soften low skilled resistance compared to a reduction of a lump sum transfer. Formally,
∂EUL
∂M
< 0 according to (16) does not contradict (15) being positive.
For a strictly positive number of immigrants, the sign of the tax effect is ambiguous.
Any migrant influence on τ leads to a divergence of the stage 3 tax rate from the one
maximizing native support at stage 1, controlling for single-mindedness and the effects
on u and h, captured by the unemployment and skill ratio effects. In connection with
a possible nonnegativity of dτ
dM
, this may lead to ∂
2SN
∂M2
> 0. Therefore, Proposition 3
provides only a sufficient condition for immigrant admittance. However, we have the
following
Corrolary. If the host country admits a positive, but finite number of immigrants in
equilibrium, immigration decreases the tax rate and is unambiguously immoderate from
the native low skilled point of view.
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An optimal finite number of immigrants balances the political gains and losses of
increasingM , such that (13) is zero. Because the high skilled are unambiguous winners,
the low skilled must be harmed by such immigration. This is concordant with the
results of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1995), according to which
a majority of natives prefers a reduction of immigration in 15 out of 22 considered
countries and there is no majority to increase it in the other countries. Moreover, the
unemployment effect must be positive in such an equilibrium, which implies dτ
dM
< 0
by Proposition 2. Because this holds for all M , the tax rate must be lower than with
closed borders, as observed empirically by Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002).
Proposition 3 highlights the dependance of immigrant toleration on the distribution
of their political activities. One obvious constellation for toleration would be the im-
migration of politically apathetic low skilled and high skilled political activists. We
would like to focus on more plausible situations by stressing the connection between
relative political weights and the rules for political naturalization. In this context, it
is important to recognize that the government can regulate some sources of political
influence like the franchise, while others like joining demonstrations or interest groups
are very hard to impede. For the sake of concreteness, we assume that an immigrant’s
political importance depends on his interest group activities and his voting rights with
the host government having the option to limit the latter.10
We will now show that the manipulation of voting rights can create an original support
for immigration, which would not exist for full political naturalization. To make this
point, let a low skilled native have the relative political influence λL = (vL+ΛL)/(vH+
ΛH), where ΛL is the per capita influence of his pressure group and the voting influence
is vL. While the high and the low skilled have equal voting influence vH = vL = v,
the per capita lobbying weight of a high skilled exceeds the per capita weight of a low
skilled: ΛH > ΛL, such that λL < 1. Such a constellation is absolutely compatible
with a political bias towards the low skilled: Although a single high skilled is more
important than a single low skilled, the low skilled as a whole can have more influence.
Whenever hN > 1/λL, (14) holds for all α ∈ [1/2, 1).
At stage 3, his single-mindedness provides an unemployed with higher political weight
than an employed low skilled. For convenience, we assume that this higher homogeneity
10 Of course, immigrants may use demonstrations and lobbying to fight for more political rights. In
that sense, the government would find itself trapped in additional commitment problem as it may
be induced to alter the announced naturalization policy. We do not model this problem here.
However, one can consider the political weights presented below as a reduced form incorporating
these repercussions.
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affects voting and interest group behavior equally, such that λU = φ > 1.
Except for voting rights, immigrants and natives of the same type are identical. Letting
ω ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of immigrants not receiving the franchise implies the
relative weights:
µH =
(1− ω)v + ΛH
v + ΛH
, (17)
µL =
(1− ω)v + ΛL
v + ΛH
, (18)
µU = φµL. (19)
In accordance with fundamental equity considerations, franchise restrictions can not
be differentiated according to skills, but must affect all immigrants equally.
Proposition 4. For any positive number of immigrants, a limitation of voting rights
decreases both the tax and the low skilled unemployment rate.
Proof. Because of
du
dω
=
1
D
∂W
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(>0)
∂T
∂ω
dτ
dω
=
−1
D
∂W
∂u︸ ︷︷ ︸
(>0)
∂T
∂ω
,
the sign of
∂T
∂ω
=
MH
v + ΛH
− ML
v + ΛH
[
−(1− u) + υu(1− τ)
τ
]
is decisive for the effects on τ and u. Using (4) yields
∂T
∂ω
=
ML
(1 + ΛH)(λLNL + µLML)
[NL(hMλL − hN) +MH(µL − µH)] .
Due to ΛH > ΛL, this expression is negative iff M > 0. ¤.
Naturally, a restriction of immigrant voting rights is effective only when some immi-
grants enter. If this is the case, increasing ω has two effects: First, the government
cares more for the skill group losing relatively less voters. Second, the importance of
interest group activities increases. Both effects shift political power towards the high
skilled, a finding that reflects in the reaction of native support at stage 1:
∂SN
∂ω
=
dτ
dω
[
µHMH
1− τ + µLML
[
1− u
1− τ −
u
τ
]
+
(1− λU)µLuNL
τ
]
(20)
+
du
dω
[
NH
wH
∂wH
∂u
+ λLNL
(1− u)
wL
dwL
du
+
u
b
db
du
]
− λLNL du
dω
log
(1− τ)wL
b
.
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This expression shows that for not too high levels of immigration, there is unambiguous
support for immigrant franchise restrictions: provided that M is low enough to render
the term in square brackets in the first line of (20) negative, ∂SN
∂ω
> 0. However, the
support-maximizing immigration policy contains provisions for both M and ω, with
immigrant admissions depending negatively on immigrant franchise, and immigrant
franchise depending negatively on the number of immigrants.
Proposition 5. The government pursues either a closed border policy or admits
some immigrants, restricting their political rights. The latter option is chosen when
both the immigrant skill ratio and the political bias towards the low skilled are not too
low. In the absence of voting right restrictions, immigrants are never admitted.
Proof. Let SN(M,ω) denote the political support attained by immigration policy
(M,ω). Consider the case hM = hN and hN/. Since SN(0, 0) = SN(0, ω
′) for all ω′ > 0
and ∂SN (0,ω
′)
∂M
> 0, support is maximized by some positive M and ω. By continuity, the
same argument must hold when immigration diminishes the skill ratio a bit and/or the
low skilled have some political advantage. ¤.
This proposition shows that the host’s ability to restrict immigrants’ political rights
can be a prerequisite for their admission. In the case of skill-neutral immigration
hM = hN with full political integration (ω = 0), the host is indifferent with respect
to M . However, admitting some immigrants and restricting their voting rights shifts
political power to the high skilled with the simultaneous alleviation of the commitment
problem increasing overall political support. Because political support is continuous
in both M and ω, the same reasoning applies if immigrants are somewhat less skilled
than the average native and/or there is some political bias towards the low skilled.
Otherwise, the government finds it optimal to follow a closed-border policy.
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a rationale why a government inclined to serve the interests of
the poor might tolerate immigration although this harms the native low skilled in equi-
librium. The argument rests on the government being trapped in a time inconsistency
problem with respect to the unemployment benefit. Immigrants affect the politico-
economic conditions and may therefore mitigate the lack of government commitment.
The removal of the labor market inefficiency weakens the resistance of the native low
skilled, relative to a situation where commitment plays no role. As franchise restric-
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tions can be used as a tool to create the desired political effect, the main implications
of the model are consistent with a number of empirical observations: immigration is
accompanied by low skilled resistance, it leads to a reduction of the tax rate and few
immigrants are naturalized.
One natural way to extend the analysis would be to allow for skill requirements. In the
present model, the constant-returns-to-scale technology makes any policy admitting
both skill types equivalent to a policy tolerating a respective number of just one skill
type. Hence the decision is whether to allow only low or only high skilled individuals.
Since the presence of each low skilled increases the ex post incentive for redistribution
while each high skilled reduces it, the optimal immigration policy will admit only the
latter. However, it would then not be optimal anymore to curtail the political rights
of immigrants.
Due to the similarity of political support to a utilitarian welfare function, it is tempting
to conclude that this reasoning could also work with a benevolent government maxi-
mizing the sum of resident utilities. However, this turns out not to be true: When all
individuals have equal weight, immigration is bound to tilt political power towards the
low skilled, aggravating the commitment problem. Therefore, our argument in favor of
immigration is confined to the politico-economic framework.
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